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The Spirit of the Common Law. By Roscoe Pound. Boston, Marshall Jones Co.,
192L pp. xv, 224.
Dean Pound's main thesis in this volume is that there is a fundamental mode
of thought, inherited from feudalism, "a mode of dealing with legal situations and
with legal problems .... which has always tempered the individualism of our
law, and now that the change from a pioneer, agricultural, rural society to a
settled, industrial and commercial and even predominantly urban society calls
for a new order of legal ideas, has been the chief resource of the courts in the
movement which has long been proceeding quietly beneath the surface in judicial
decision." * * * * "The first solvent of individualism in our law and the chief
factor in fashioning its system and many of its characteristic doctrines was the
analogy of this feudal relation, suggesting the juristic conception of rights,
duties and liabilities arising, not from express undertaking, the terms of any
transaction, voluntary wrongdoing or culpable action, but simply and solely as
incidents of a relation." (PP. I5, 20.)
Our public law, the author says, is founded on Magna Carta. "But Profesgor
Adams has shown that, as a legal document, Magna Carta is a formulation of
the duties involved in the jural relation of the king to his tenants in chief. As
the Middle Ages confused sovereignty and property, it was easy enough to draw
an instrument declaring the duties incident to the relation of lord and man which,
when the former happened to be king, could be made later to serve as defining
the duties owing by the king in the relation of king and subject." (pp. 25, 26.)
That every man has certain natui-al rights deduced from a social compact is
pronounced to be "an alien conception in our law. After working no little mis-
chief in our constitutional law in the nineteenth century, this conception of
natural rights going back of all constitutions and merely declared thereby is
giving way and there are signs that we shall return to the true common-law
conception of the rights and duties which the law imposes on or annexes to the
relation of ruler and ruled." (p. 26.)
Maine's position that the evolution of law is a progress from status to contract
"is a generalization from Roman legal history only. It shows the course of evolu-
tion of Roman law. On the -other hand it has no basis in Anglo-American legal
history, and the whole course of English and American law to-day is belying it,
unless indeed, we are progressing backward." (p. 28.)
In studying the characteristics of the growth of American common law, Dean
Pound marks it off into two periods.
"These periods are (i) the classical common-law period, the end of the
sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth century, and (2) the period that
some day, when the history of the common law as a law of the world comes to be
written, will be regarded as no less classical than the first-the period of legal
'development in the United States that came to an end with the Civil War. In
the one the task was to go over the decisions and legislation of the past and make
a system for the future. " In the other the task was to examine the whole body
of English case law with reference to what was applicable to the facts of life in
America and what was not." (pp. 41, 42.)
This description of what is presented as a second period seems to make too
much of English case law as a source of authority. It ignores the claims of legal
philosophy and right reason to a share in the work. It limits the field by exclud-
ing consideration of the judicial precedents of continental Europe.
[788]
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Dean Pound discusses at some length the historical events which illustrate his
subject, and emphasizes its character as a branch of social science.
"At common law the king is parens patriae, the father of his country, which
is but the medieval mode of putting what we mean to-day when we say that the
State is the guardian of social interests. In the feudal way of looking at it, the
relation of king and subject involved duties of protection as well as rights of
allegiance. The king, then, was charged with the duty of protecting public and
social interests, and he wielded something very like our modern police power.
But this power was limited on every side by the maxims of the common law
and the bounds set by the law of the land." (p. 68.)
The notion of the supremacy of law was thus in England bound up with that
of the supremacy of the sovereign. It was a natural function of constitutional
government.
"We may be assured, therefore, that the supremacy of law, established by the
common law against Tudor and Stuart, is not to disappear. We may be con-
fident that we shall have, not merely laws, expressions of the popular will for
the time being, but law, an expression of reason applied to the relations of man
with man and of man with the State. We may be confident also that in the
new period of legal development which is at hand as in like periods in legal
history there will be a working over of the jural materials of the past and
working into them of new ideas from without. We shall be warranted in
prophesying that this working over will be effected by means of a philosophical
theory of right and justice and conscious attempt to make the law conform to
ideals. Such a period will be a period of scientific law, made, if not by judges,
then by lawyers trained in the universities; not one of arbitrary law based on
the fiat of any sovereign, however hydra-headed. For the notion of law as the
will of the people belongs to the past era of a complete and stable system in
which certainty and security were the sole ends. Throughout legal history law
has been stagnant whenever the imperative idea has been uppermost. Law has
lived and grown through juristic activity. It has been liberalized by ideas of
natural right or justice or reasonableness or utility, leading to criteria by which
rules and principles and standards might be tested, not by ideas of force and
command and the sovereign will as the ultimate source of authority. Attempts
to reduce the judicial office in the United States to the purely mechanical func-
tion of applying rules imposed fronf without and of serving as a mouthpiece for
the popular will for the moment are not in the line of progress." (pp. 83, 84.)
The guarantees of individual rights established by our constitutions have had
in England "to give way to modern legislation. In America they have stood con-
tinually between the people, or large classes of the people, and legislation they
desire. In consequence, the courts were long put in a false position of doing
nothing and obstructing everything, which it was impossible for the layman to
interpret aright." (p. io3.) "Men are saying to-day that material welfare is
the great end to which all institutions must be directed and by which they must
be measured. Men are not asking merely to be allowed to achieve welfare; they
are asking to have welfare achieved for them through organized society."
(p. 1o9.)
Legislative law-making the author is disposed to extend rather than restrict.
In that connection he tells a good story on the authority of Jhering. A question
of commercial law was submitted to a German Law Professor. "He returned
an elaborate and thoroughly reasoned answer based upon the principles of the
Roman law, the basis of the common law of Continental Europe'and hence of
legal instruction. Upon suggestion that he had omitted to notice a section of the
commercial code which appeared to govern, he responded that if the commercial
code saw fit to go counter to reason and the Roman law it was no affair of his."
(p. 157.)
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Dean Pound regards Kant as the prophet of a new dispensation, who estab-
lished a new method of legal science,--a new stage of legal development, which
characterizes the twentieth century. Kant held that "legal justice" is not
immutable. Fate is behind it. "The old natural law called for search for an
eternal body of principles to which the positive law must be made to conform.
This new natural law called for search for a body of rules governing legal
development, to which law will conform do what we may." (p. 163.) "Legal
principles are not absolute, but are relative to time and place." (p. 172.)
Equity has "sought to prevent the unconscientious exercise of legal rights; to-day
we seek to prevent the anti-social exercise of them. Equity imposed moral
limitations; the law of to-day is imposing social limitations." (p. 186.)
The author closes with this formula of methodology: "In the past century
we studied law from within. The jurists of to-day are studying it from with-
out." (p. 212.) This is a good illustration of one prominent feature of his
style of composition. It is compact, and antithetic. He relies much on drawing
contrasts. He aims to be plain, and talks straight to the point. He has handled
a difficult subject with force and spirit.
Smimo E. BALDwiN
* New Haven, Conn.
Essays on Constitutional Law and Equity. By Henry Schofield. In Two
Volumes. Boston, Chipman Law Publishing Co., i92i. Vol. I, pp. xxiv, 1-456,
xxvi. Vol. II, pp. viii, 457-ioo6.
The late Professor Schofield, of the Law School of Northwestern University,
contributed many papers to the Illinois Law Reyiew; and in these volumes the
papers are collected by his colleagues.
As the subjects upon which Professor Schofield wrote were usually unsettled
contemporary problems, the treatment is, naturally enough, argumentative, rather
than expository. Clearness and fairness, combined now and then with a homely
thrust, make the papers peculiarly stimulating and attractive.
Take, for example, the first three, covering about one hundred pages. Here the
problem discussed is whether a federal question under the Due Process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment is raised whenever a state court, through ignorance of
state law, gives an erroneous decision. Is it not true that a state court is an agency
of the state? When a state court makes a mistake of law, does not the state
through this agency deprive the unsuccessful litigant of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law? Such is the author's contention in the first of the
papers, which appeared in i9o8 and was based upon acute reasoning and upon
language used in several opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States.
Such is his contention in the second paper, which appeared in I91o. In the third
paper, which appeared in 1916, he still makes the same contention; but Frank v.
Mangum (I915) 237 U. S. 309, 35 Sup. Ct 582, had been decided meanwhile, and,
notwithstanding favorable dicta in that case, the author honestly says:
"There is no clear instance wherein the Supreme Court of the United States
reversed a state decision administering the local law of the state on the distinct
ground of want of scientia in the state decision on a question of law or a question
of fact arising under the local state law so gross as to show that the state decision
flowed from abitrary power and not from judicial discretion." (p. 83.)
And again he says:
"It is not easy to tell from the majority opinion, however, whether the court
means to say that Frank had no federal right at all that could be denied or abridged
by the state of Georgia through its courts, or to say that he did have the federal
right stated to have the local law of Georgia concerning jury trial in criminal cases
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administered judicially and not arbitrarily, and then to decide that on Frank's own
showing the federal right was not denied or abridged by the state of Georgia
through its courts. The latter seems to be the correct interpretation of the
majority opinion." (p. go.)
And finally he says:
"Frank's case cannot be regarded as a weighty precedent to support the distinct,
separate, and independent federal right of litigants in state courts in cases arising
under the local state law to have free, fair, and impartial state tribunals, because
the existence of the right was not debated at the bar or on the bench, and its
existence plainly is debatable; and because as a matter of fact the court did not
protect and enforce any such federal right, but declined to do so, refusing even to
hear Frank's claim that the Georgia trial tribunal was not free, fair, and impartial
because mob-dominated, which refusal can be supported only on the view that such
distinct, separate, and independent federal right does not exist." (p. ioi.)
Surely no more honorable concession can be made by a contestant who for years
has argued for a doctrine by him believed to be just.
From the quotations already made, the quality of the whole mass of papers may
fairly be judged. It is impracticable to make further quotations; but as it is
important that both the scholar and the practitioner may know whether these
volumes contain matter upon subjects connected with their respective activities, a
list of the principal titles will be given. The scope covered is a great part of
Constitutional Law and a smaller part of Equity. On Constitutional Law the
papers incljxde: the Supreme Court of the United States and the enforcement of
state law by state courts; Swift v. Tyson and the uniformity of judge-made law
in state and federal courts; federal courts and mob domination of state courts;
the claim of a federal right to enforce in one state the death statute of another;
the doctrine of Haddock v. Haddock; full faith and credit v. comity and local
rules of jurisdiction and decision; new trials and the Seventh Amendment; jury
trials in original proceedings for mandamus in the state supreme court; thestate
tax on Illinois Central gross receipts and the commerce power of Congress; cruel
and unusual punishment; petit larceny as an infamous crime involving infamous
punishment; religious liberty and Bible reading in public schools; freedom of the
press; the obligation of contracts and the street railroad problem in Chicago;
the state civil service act and the power of appointment On Equity the papers
cover, among other things, the word "not" as a test of equity jurisdiction to enjoin
a breach of contract; so-called equity jurisdiction to construe and reform wills;
equity jurisdiction to abate and enjoin illegal saloons as public nuisances; right of
workmen to enjoin a threatened strike; irregularity in an execution sale as a
foundation of jurisdiction of federal courts to manage insolvent public service
corporations. These are the chief papers; and there are many others, almost
equally important, in the form of brief comments on recent decisions.
This is a long and varied list; but Professor Schofield's colleagues have
arranged the material in logical order, and the result amply justifies the labor of
author and of editors. It is true that these volumes will disappoint readers who
wish merely a digest of decisions; but they will not disappoint readers who enjoy
close reasoning and who give the reasoner permission to argue that both the
readers and the courts are wrong.
EUGENE WAmBAUGIH
Harvard Law School
Oxford Studies in Social and Legal History. Sir Paul Vinogradoff, Editor.
Volume VI. XI: Studies in the Hundred Rolls: Some Aspects of Thirteenth-
Century Administration. By Helen M. Cam. XII: Proceedings against the
Crown (1216-1377). By Ludwik Ehrlich. Oxford, Clarendon Press, i92i. pp.
x, 198, 274.
In the volumes already published of Professor Vinogradoff's series of Oxford
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Studies in Social and Legal History, the social have outnumbered the legal studies.
With the exception of the valuable paper by the late Professor Barbour on
Contract in Early English Equity, there has been no study until the present volume
upon legal history. Dr. Ehrlich's contribution to this volume helps to restore the
balance as it is a technical study of certain important phases of thirteenth and
fourteenth century law. The title of the essay Proceedings against the Crown
hardly promises so much as it actually gives, since it covers in a rather wide range
many. forms of assertion of private or communal right 'against the king. Dr.
Ehrlich studies a series of topics first for the reign of Henry III, then for Edward
I's, and then to a little past the middle of the fourteenth century. Beginning with
fundamental considerations, as the contemporary postulates of legal thought and
the relation of the king to the law, he goes on to consider how these conceptions
took form in actual practice in regard to the acts of the king, wrongs committed
by him, his privileges, his actual power, and his administrative machine. Then
remedies are discussed with special reference to the ordinary courts including
corain rege, and then restitution or compensation. The king can do no wrong
(Nihil enin aliud potest rex in terris . . . . nisi id solum quod de jure potest.
Bracton, f. 107) means in the law not that someone else has done the wrong, but
that the king "must not, was not allowed, not entitled, to do wrong; his acts if
against law were not legal acts but wrongs." These wrongs the courts may
correct, but no writ can be had against the king. Proceedings against him are by
permission. One of Dr. Ehrlich's most important contributions to our knowledge
is the establishment of the fact that in the time of Henry III there were no written
petitions. They were introduced by Edward I, following a practice at Rome and
in some continental states. He supposes that earlier proceedings were began
orally before the council. In this he is undoubtedly right, since that was the
form of procedure in the great council in all kinds of cases and probably it was so
also ,in all royal courts before the introduction of prerogative procedure. The
study of the development of the petition under Edward I and of procedure upon
them in parliament is particularly valuable and is more thorough and illuminating
than any before made.
On many topics new light is thrown. The idea that the king is rather an insti-
tution than a person is developing and also the conception of public utility as an
end to be sought, but at the same time the foundations are being laid of those
claims of absolute power which were advanced by the Stuarts. Incidentally the
apparent contradiction in Bracton between the king as above the law and the law
as above the king is discussed as a reflection of actual conditions in the law. The
growth of national feeling, the responsibility of officers for their acts, and the
operation of exchequer and chancery courts in the fourteenth century are included.
The index to this study is quite unsatisfactory.
If it was Miss Cam's original intention to study administrative abuses in Essex,
as depicted in the Hundred Rolls, she found herself compelled to devote the
greater part of her essay to two preliminary investigations: the development of
the articles, the capitula, of the Eyre, and the character and trustworthiness of
the Hundred Rolls as historical material. The gradual development of the few
simple demands of the Assize of Northampton in 1176 into the sweeping inquiries
of the last part of the thirteenth century and their bearing on the Quo Warranto
investigation is an interesting history. Between 1244 and 1278, 105 articles were
added to the list, and before the Eyre was abandoned others still. Probably,
however, the part of this study of the greatest permanent value to scholars will
be the analysis of the Hundred Rolls themselves. It has generally been taken for
granted that these Rolls as printed by the Record Commission can be accepted at
their face value, and they have been largely used on that supposition. Miss Cam
shows, however, that they are a quite uncritical combination of material from
BOOK REVIEWS
various sources and of varying value, and that critical study is imperatively needed
before they can be used as historical evidence. No one who hereafter wishes to
draw upon them can neglect Miss Cam's study.
GEOR a BURTON _ADAMcS
Yale University
Men and Books Fanwu in the Law. By Frederick C. Hicks. Introduction by
Harlan F. Stone. Rochester, Lawyers' Co-operative Publishing Co., 1921.
pp. 259.
Hamilton Odell, a distinguished member of the New York Bar, who died a few
weeks ago in his eighty-eighth year, is said to have found keen enjoyment during
his last years in reading the Advanced Sheets of the New York State Reports.
But it takes a long life devoted to the law to enable a man to find enjoyment and
relaxation in such a pastime. A taste for law literature is a cultivated taste.
The flood of new law literature, which is overwhelming to a practicing lawyer
of to-day, has made the task of keeping up with even the latest decisions an
immense one, and discourages lawyers, young and old, from seeking general
improvement or relaxation in the reading of reports. I have no doubt Mr. Odell
had read Coke's Reports, but I doubt if there are half a dozen of his survivors
practicing in New York City who have done so. Except for selected cases, there
are probably few lawyers to-day who have any precise familiarity with the ancient
literature which instructed the able lawyers who distinguished our profession in the
early half of the last century.
Professor Hicks has performed a great service to the legal fraternity, and indeed
to the educated public at large, in giving us this thoroughly entertaining little
volume. We have here an easy and pleasant means of obtaining a little knowledge
of certain legal writings which are monuments in the history of the law. And the
sketches of the seven great lawyers whose fame has been perpetuated to our time
because of their authorship of these historic documents supplies a need of the
profession. This book will fit into a fair sized pocket. It contains interesting
and human facts about the men and books it tells about. It will shorten a railroad
journey for any educated person, even if he has not had the advantages of pursuing
the law as a calling, and will make a lawyer during a quiet evening forget about a
dissatisfied female client or the lack of intelligence displayed by a jury.
The great men whose famous books have led Professor Hicks to draw them
to our attention were not closet students remote from the great world. Indeed the
writings of three of the four Englishmen he treats of, got them into considerable
political trouble.
The prerogatives of the King; a dispositiofi in some quarters to extoll the
excellence of the Civil Law in comparison with the Common Law of England;
the powers of the Court of Chancery to take jurisdiction of cases which had
already been decided by the Court of King's Bench; and the "liberties of Parlia-
ment" aroused violent feeling among politicians as well as among lawyers during
the seventeenth century. It involved some personal peril to write law books in
those times.
John Cowell wrote a book on the Common Law of England which won for
him some fame. He then proceeded to write another work called The Interpreter
which was a law dictionary. It is reported that this book gave great offence
because of a few statements therein contained. It was brought up in Parliament
and received the attention of the King, the -Lords Spiritual, the House of Lords,
and the House of Commons during a considerable period in i6og and i6io. All
the fuss resulted in the King issuing a proclamation from which we quote a few
clauses expressing in the quaint wording of the period sentiments which are not*
unfamiliar at the present day. After reciting the disposition of "this later age and
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times of the world wherein we are fallen," "such an itching in the tongues
and pens of most men, as nothing is left unsearched to the bottom, both in talldng
and writing"; "whereupon it cannot otherwise fall out, but that when men go out
of their element, andmeddle with things above their capacity, themselves shall not
only go astray and stumble in darkness, but will mislead also diverse others with
themselves into many mistakings and errors; the proof whereof we have lately
had by a book written by Dr. Cowell called 'The Interpreter."' Wherefore, to
prevent the said errors and inconveniences his Majesty "resolved to make choice
of Commissioners, that shall look more narrowly into the nature of all those things
which shall be put to the press."
But it was not much easier to suppress a published book in I6io than it is to-daj.
While Cowell was put under technical arrest during the investigation of his work,
he was not actually restrained of his liberty. "Like a wise man he took his leave
of the press, and retired to his colledge, and his private studies." A generation
later his book figured in the trial of Archbishop Laud, it being charged that Laud
had connived at its being printed in 1637.
Lord Coke's character and stiff-necked defiance of the King and his Lord
Chancellor have made his career as a judge and politician as famous as his reports
and his annotations of Littleton. When the King asked him whether if at any
time in a case depending before the judges which his Majesty conceived to concern
him, either in power or profit, and thereupon required to consult with them, and
that they should stay proceedings in the meantime, they ought not to stay accord-
ingly, the Lord Chief Justice of the King's Bench said for answer that "when
that case should be, he would do that which should be fit for a Judge to do."
In a land where we have so many elected judges who receive their positions on
the bench from some powerful politician, this famous story cannot be repeated too
often or made too familiar.
But Coke was removed from his office as chief justice. He suffered for his
judicial courage and integrity, just as judges in our own time have been refused a
re-election, because of their unwillingness to yield to the demand of some powerful
politician. It is pleasant to learn, however, that having been retired as a judge
he was elected to Parliament and immediately became a leader and an advocate of
the "liberties of Parliament." That it was as dangerous to incur the disfavor of
the King in Parliament as on the bench is shown from the fact that at the dissolu-
tion of Parliament he was arrested and confined in the Tower for nine months.
Blackstone's reputation was based on his Commentaries, first issued in 1765, and
still largely used by law students. Yet he too had his human side. Professor
Hicks tells us that the Commentaries were written late in the evening with a bottle
of wine before him "in order to correct or prevent the depression sometimes
attendant upon close study." He acknowledged and lamented his bad temper.
Kent's Commentaries were but a small part in the busy life of the judge. We
are told that the lectures upon which they were based were delivered to a very
small assemblage of a few students and lawyers. In the winter of 1794-5 he
delivered twenty-six lectures, two a week, to seven students and thirty-six gentle-
men, chiefly lawyers and law students who did not belong to Columbia College,
where he was Professor of Law. The next year only two students put in an
appearance and to these he read thirty-one lectures.
Our author has given us a few pages of Kent's notes written upon his copy of
Edward Livingston's Penal Code which show how Kent annotated what he read.
This is both interesting and instructive.
Edward Livingston occupied many distinguished positions. As a young man
he was elected to Congress. Shortly afterward at the age of thirty-seven he
became Mayor of New York City, and United States Attorney for the District
of New York by appointment of President Jefferson, and he held two of these
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offices, if not all three of them, at the same time. Later he became again a member
of Congress and a United States Senator from Louisiana. President Jackson
appointed him Secretary of State in 1831, and two years later he was appointed
American Minister at Paris. He attained all this recognition notwithstanding the
fact that his career was burdened through the defalcation of a subordinate in his
office as Mayor of New York. He resigned his office of Mayor and accepted
responsibility although none of the missing funds had passed through his hands.
The debt was finally paid, principal and interest, but not until within a few years
of his death. This misfortune led to his removal to New Orleans where his abili-
ties were promptly recognized. While there he found time to prepare a Civil
Practice Act which was adopted by the legislature in i8o5. He was a member
of a Commission to revise the Civil Code of the state, whose work for the most
part was adopted by the legislature. But his great interest which occupied ,him
during his whole life was in the preparation of a penal code. This work
challenged the attention of the foremost thinkers of the world and is his great
monument. Although his penal codes were never formally adopted in the United
States "they constitute a thesaurus from which the world has ever since been
drawing ideas and principles."
Professor Hicks' book serves to remind us that the law offers fame of an endur-




The Law of Sales. By John Barker Waite. Chicago, Callaghan & Co., 1921.
pp. xii, 385.
In a rather long preface the author suggests that a text book should be distin-
guished from a digest by its analysis of the rules on which decisions are based,
and that, in spite of previous attempts to analyze the law of sales, it is
always possible that a new writer may bring something of value by way of expla-
nation and of reason for the rules, and that there is also possible value in a new
method of presentation. This is certainly true, and it is matter for regret that so
little can be found to commend in the author's efforts. The book is not clearly
written and, in the main, the author makes slight attempt at original analysis, and
often is content to say in substance that some courts decide one way, and some courts
another, and that the whole matter is much confused. There are frequent repe-
titions, as, for instance, on pages 42 and 49, specification as an indication of transfer
of title is dealt with twice, when one statement would have been enough. On page
i8o, we find a paragraph on "What a warranty is." On page 187, the same
inquiry is repeated under the heading of "What are Warranties?" Nor is the
book free from absolute inaccuracies. One would hardly expect a professor of
law to say that a decision in Alabama "expressly overrules" a Massachusetts case.
Such a method of statement is of course of no great moment, but it illustrates a
loose and confused style throughout the book. The author says (at page 29)
"An undertaking by the seller to deliver the goods to the buyer at a particular
place seems occasionally to have led to a holding that title did not pass until such
delivery had been accomplished." Presumably all courts would hold that such was
the presumption, though doubtless it is possible to transfer ownership at an earlier
time. The author's statement would lead one to infer that the decisions of the
courts to which he refers are of doubtful validity. There is but a brief treatment
of the subject of transfer of ownership by bills of lading, and the author does not
refer to the Pomerene Act, which seriously affects the correctness of some of his
statements.
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The author's main puzzle seems to be why it is that shipment of goods by a
seller to a buyer in fulfilment of an order or contract should pass title on delivery
of the goods to the carrier. He says (page 48) : "The rule is a purely arbitrary
one ;" and again (page 50) : "The theory on which this holding is based is any-
thing but clear." On page 269, in dealing with the Statute of Frauds, he refers
to the same matter again. His difficulty is that he rightly enough is unable to see
any authority on the part of the carrier to assent to the transfer of ownership;'
and he wrongly supposes that such authority must be assumed in order to produce
the result. Of course the truth is that the buyer has himself previously assented
to the shipment as a means of delivery. The carrier receives the goods as agent
or bailee for the buyer, but it is the buyer's previous assent which produces the
transfer of ownership. If the buye" had said, put the goods into a particular hole
in the ground for me, the ownership would have been transferred when the seller
fulfilled the order, for precisely the same reason.
Pages 286 to 336 are devoted to a reprint of the Uniform Sales Act, with very
slight annotations of decisions. There seems to be little reference, however, to
the effect of the Act in the body of the book.
The volume because of the size naturally invites comparison with the brief
treatises of Tiffany and Burdick, and the comparison is much to the advantage
of the older books.
SAMUEL WILLiSTON
Harvard Law School
Cambridge Studies in English Legal History. Harold Dexter Hazeltine, Editor.
The History of Conspiracy and Abuse of Legal Procedure. By Percy Henry
Winfield. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1921. pp. xxvii, 219.
Increasing the interest which this work, the first volume of a new series of publi-
cations, naturally inspires is the general preface written by the editor, Professor
Hazeltine. Even though the hopes and promises there held out are only partially
realized, we shall ultimately have a set of studies embracing both monographs and
editions of texts which will enrich the literature of English legal history.
In its largest aspect this book is a study of the abuses connected with legal
procedure down to the end of the eighteenth century. The term conspiracy in its
earlier sense signified an illegal combination to abuse legal procedure, to promote
false accusations and suits before a court. Slightly more than the first half of the
work is given over to a detailed and careful account of the early history of this
subject. There was both a civil and a criminal side to conspiracy, the civil proce-
dure being begun by the writ of conspiracy, and the criminal procedure by present-
ment before a court. A particularly full treatment of the writ is given (it was
statutory, no writ of conspiracy existing at common law), its scope, and the essen-
tials of liability to it. On the last point it is interesting to note that though from
almost the beginning the rule was that the writ would not lie against indictors or
jurors, there was no case which laid down the immunity of witnesses generally,
apart from those who informed the grand jury, till 1549. There is no reference
to conspiracy as a crime before 21 Edward I. From then on the records show
that the crime was a common one, even in high places. "The writ of conspiracy,
originally destined to stop false accusations, was being employed to stifle honest
ones. Evil doers who had been properly indicted procured their acquittal by a
favorable inquest, and then sued writs of conspiracy against their indictors," in
spite of the rule that the writ would not lie against indictors. In the fourteenth
century one of the commonest uses of conspiracy was in connection with combina-
tions to restrain or to interfere with trade. With the coming of the Tudors,
conspiracy on its criminal side was greatly affected by the Star Chamber, a court
without a jury, and strong enough to crush combinations to abuse legal procedure
BOOK REVIEWS -797
which might have overawed a weaker court. Moreover, the Star Chamber
influenced the later conception of conspiracy by greatly extending the meaning of
the term. By the reign of Elizabeth criminal conspiracy had come to bear very
much its modern meaning.
A chapter (v) is devoted to showing how the modem action of malicious prose-
cution developed out of the disuse of the statutory writ of conspiracy and the
substitution therefor of the action on the case in the nature of conspiracy. At
this point the subject of conspiracy, as such, is brought to an end, to give place
to a discussion of the related subjects of champerty and maintenance. Notwith-
standing Coke's contention to the contrary, it would seem that writs of champerty
and maintenance did not exist at common law. Rounding out the general subject
we have a chapter on embracery and the misconduct of jurors. In the mind of
medieval judges there was no sharp distinction between maintenance and embracery,
and it is a debatable question whether embracery, as distinct from maintenance,
was ever an offence at common law.
It is a pleasure to note the consistent use made of material from the Year
Books, much of it from Year Books which are to be had as yet only in the old
black letter editions. It is our hope that the editing of these later Year Books
does not lie outside the province of the -Cambridge Studies in English Legal
History, that the editor may have had them in mind when he referred to later
editions of legal-historical texts "which have not as yet been published in a form
consonant with modern critical standards."
GEORGE E. WOODBINE
Yale University Law School
An Introduction to the Problem of Government. By Westel W. Willoughby and
Lindsay Rogers. Garden City, Doubleday, Page & Co., 1921. pp. x, 545.
This volume is intended for student use, and seeks to analyze the chief principles
underlying the organization and conduct of government Although the chapters
are of somewhat unequal merit, the volume should serpe as a valuable aid in college
courses, if used with a book giving more detail about the structure of the important
governments of the world.
Although the book under review is chiefly devoted to principles of government,
this plan is departed from with respect to certain chapters. There is a chapter on
State Government in the United States, which is too brief to be effective, and
seems out of place in the volume. The chapter on Political Party Control in
Congress also somewhat interrupts the unity of the volume as a general discussion
of governmental principles.
Chapters X to XXIV of the volume present a'satisfactory and interesting analysis
of the concrete problems of government. The functions of the legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial departments are clearly discussed. The different types of govern-
mental organizations are outlined. The chapter on responsible parliamentary
government is particularly good. That on presidential or congressional govern-
ment is not so good, in part because it limits itself to the national government of
the United States. In the consideration of local government, the authors devote
no attention to cities, and thus ignore one of the most important factors in the
government of modern states. In the discussion of governmental problems they
follow the policy of substantially all other authors, in the notion that different
types of local government may be discussed independently.
The authors are most effective in their discussion of concrete governmental
problems. The first three chapters are the weakest in the book, and the first nine
are less effective than those that follow. No college student can be expected to
display great interest in chapter II which is devoted to preliminary definitions,
especially when the thought is concealed behind such complex sentences as:
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"It does not need to be said that no such community of completely rationalized
and moralized people has ever existed, and there is little evidence to indicate that
such a perfected group will come into existence within any future time to which
any finite limits may be set." (page 25.)
Chapter III on the sphere of government is interesting but somewhat mechanical,
'and presents no incisive discussion of the expansion of governmental functions.
In this chapter the authors find the distinction between civil and criminal acts
easier than did the United States Supreme Court in Hepner v. United States (igog)
213 U. S. 103, 29 Sup. Ct 474- 1 ,
Some misleading statements appear, but in view of the large field covered there
is substantial freedom from actual error. The authors imply that a method of
state constitutional change is common in this country, which has long disappeared
from all states except Delaware. (pages 89-9o.) They place the burden upon
the voter for unsatisfactory government in this country (page 137), and do not
sufficiently emphasize the fact that the complexities of governmental organization
place an impossible task upon the voter. In chapter IX, dealing with Representative
Government, the initiative and referendum deserve more attention than they receive.
In their discussion of judicial contfol over legislation, the authors assume to some*
extent the traditional but erroneous view that a declaration of unconstitutionality
involves little or no discretion in a court, though at the same time making an
exception from this view with respect to "due process of law." (page 391.)
Special attention has been given to the typographical form of the book under
review. It is easy to read. The authors have added materially to its value for
student use by appending to each chapter a group of "Topics for Further Investi-
gation." There is need for a volume of the type which the authors have produced,
and the volume under review probably best meets this need; although some
improvement can be made in the second edition.
WALTER F. DODD
Chicago, Ill.
